The "go-stop-go" of Italian civil nuclear programs, beset by lack of
  strategic planning, exploitation for personal gain and unscrupulous political
  conspiracies: 1946-1987 by Baracca, Angelo et al.
The “go-stop-go” of Italian civil nuclear programs, beset by lack of
strategic planning, exploitation for personal gain and unscrupulous
political conspiracies: 1946-1987
Angelo Baracca a, Giorgio Ferrari b and Roberto Renzetti c
a Department of Physics, University of Florence; b Former ENEL specialist; c Physicist, www.fisicamente.net 
Angelo Baracca (corresponding author)
Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Florence
via G. Sansone, 1
 50019 Sesto Fiorentino (FI)
Tel.: (39)3280196987
e-mail: baracca@fi.infn.it
Giorgio Ferrari
Former Enel nuclear expert
Via A.Dulceri,171
00176 Roma
Tel.: (39)064513698
e-mail: giorgio.ferrari@autoproduzioni.net
Roberto Renzetti
Physicist www.fisicamente.net 
Via Avegno 58
00165 Roma (RM)
Tel (39)0666417178
e-mail: fisicamente@fisicamente.net  
Abstract
The Italian civil nuclear projects had a very early origin, with the first ideas originating as far back as 1945. The
construction of the first three plants dated back to the period 1956-1964, and at that time Italy ranked third in the
world for installed power. However, the very ambitious projects were immediately after thwarted in the early
1960s by the “Ippolito trial”. Actually, a whole range of advanced programmes for the development of the country
went to a stop, since they clashed with national and international major powers. Italy was relegated to a second
rank power. The fourth nuclear plan was designed in 1970, and its  commercial operation began in 1981. In the
meantime, a strong anti-nuclear movement grew, and the position of the pro-nuclear Italian Communist Party
began to change. After the Chernobyl accident, a national referendum was held, which in 1987 put an end to the
Italian nuclear programmes.
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nationalization of electric energy; the “Ippolito trial”; National Energy Plan (PEN); anti-nuclear
movement;  National Authority for nuclear and Alternative Energies (ENEA); 1987 referendum.
1. Introduction. The framework
Nuclear programmes are always, in every country, very complex processes, due to the complexity
of this technology and the huge economic and political interests it involves. But in Italy further
complications, typical of the Italian system, usually arise in any process such as conflicts of interest,
off-stage plots, and dark manoeuvres, if not corruption. The debate on the nuclear programmes in
Italy has been extremely harsh. Popular movements have been very strong and polarized in certain
phases, and the evaluations of these  programmes  by different social components have often been
quite different, or divergent. The international context has played an important role in many phases
of the Italian nuclear  programmes, not  always in transparent  ways.  For these reasons,  it  is  not
simple to reconstruct a true history of the Italian nuclear programmes.1 Moreover, in our opinion a
full reconstruction cannot be restricted to the analysis of official documents and archives, though
these are of course very important, however deficient they may be. It must consider internal and
external political events, and the evolution of power relations in the country, with dynamics and
motivations  that  are  often  far  from  clear--  Italy  is,  after  all,  the  country  of  mysteries.  Some
reconstructions reflect partisan views on nuclear power. 2
While trying to take into account all these aspects, our reconstruction will necessarily be very
concise.
2. Some peculiar features of the situation
There is a number of both internal and international factors that we consider significant, including
typical drawbacks and contradictions of Italian affairs.
i)  Italy  came  out  of  the  war,  socially  and  economically,  deeply  destroyed.  There  was  no
technologically  advanced industry  or  know-how.  In the  first  two post-war decades,  the  private
electric companies were among the strongest economic and political powers.
ii) Before the war there was no scientific research centre, apart from the Institute of Physics in
Rome, in which Enrico Fermi and his group carried out the fundamental neutron experiments in
1934: 3 but the Fermi group had no real possibility of acquiring the equipment necessary to develop
its programmes, and the racial laws of 1938 were the final impulse for most members of the group
to leave Italy, along with other physicists. Only Edoardo Amaldi stayed in Italy, trying to keep up an
activity of fundamental research under the Nazi occupation,4 and to rebuild and relaunch Italian
physics after the war.5 There was therefore a serious shortage of trained staff.
iii) In these precarious conditions, it appears noteworthy that the radical novelty and potential of
nuclear energy were grasped immediately after the nuclear explosions on Japan by a small number
of young physicists and engineers. Amaldi, and some other physicists, supported the early projects,
perceiving the strong relationship between technology and fundamental physics, in which they were
more interested.  These young scholars had the capacity for establishing contacts with the right
people, and translating this early perception into concrete projects in the field of nuclear technology.
iv) In spite of these precarious conditions, Italy was the only country among the war losers which
successfully planned and undertook projects and activities in the field of nuclear energy. Germany
was forbidden for a long time to develop activities in this field. Japan was a very different story,
since the US carried out in that country a subtle and widespread propaganda campaign aimed at
minimizing the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, exalting the progressive role of “civil” nuclear
technology.6
v) However, the enlightened Italian promoters of nuclear projects faced at the beginning a crucial
precondition, since the peace treaty under negotiation in Paris (with Italy in a marginal role) could
have forbidden every activity in the applied nuclear field. Not before autumn 1946 was such a
danger thwarted. But only the subscription by the country of the NATO treatise in 1949 gave the
green light to a nuclear agreement with the US in 1955 (during the take off of the Atoms for Peace
campaign).
vi) In this complex context, the scant group of young Italian promoters, with no direct experience
in the new field, planned and actively started in the following couple of decades a wide spectrum of
nuclear  projects,  covering  almost  the full  range of  the  nuclear  cycle,  including the  design  and
construction of a domestic nuclear reactor.
vii)  The  Italian  political  class  and  governments  showed  however  great  indifference,  and
ignorance, towards nuclear energy. The early initiatives in this field were undertaken by private
companies (CISE, 1946).  The earliest  State  initiative had to  wait  the year  1952 (CNRN). This
situation contrasts sharply with what happened in the other countries, where specially-constituted
public bodies were established (AEC in the US, CEA in France, AEA in the UK).
viii) However, the private initiative introduced a deep contradiction, since the powerful private
electrical industry strenuously opposed the nationalization of the electric sector. Paradoxically, this
contradictory situation brought to the surprisingly quick and precocious construction of the first
three nuclear plants (1955-1964), among the earliest in the world. But this sudden start did not
reflect a coherent plan, and took place in the absence of a national law for the nuclear sector, which
was seen by private industry as a step towards nationalization.
ix)  Just when this remarkable result was being achieved, in the early 1960s, the Italian nuclear
ambitions came to an abrupt stop, due to the explosion of a blatant scandal, whose true causes and
instigators  have  never  been  completely  clarified.  Actually,  the  nuclear  choice  was  opposed by
powerful,  mainly  international,  forces  that  pushed for  a  subordinate  role  of  the  country  in  the
Western block. In their view, Italy was to remain an energy-dependent producer of mass consumer
goods, basically excluded from advanced technologies. After the stop to the nuclear  programmes,
Italy became completely dependent on oil (see Figure 1).
  Figure 1. Historical evolution of post-war production of electric energy in Italy.
x) The Italian military have played a marginal role in the field of nuclear energy, although in some
phases they have designed some ambitious projects.
3. Phases of development of the Italian nuclear programmes
The development of the Italian nuclear programmes may be divided into distinct phases, separated
by sudden breaks, amid deep contradictions.
 After the early private initiatives as far back as 1946, the sudden take-off between 1955 and the
early 1960s projected Italy among the top nuclear countries in the world. However, this occurred
without a coherent programme or a nuclear law, although the ambitious target was the installation of
6,000 MW of nuclear power by 1975, a figure never reached during the whole history of Italian
nuclear programmes. There was even an original project of an Italian natural uranium, heavy water
“fog” reactor, called “Cirene”. This was never completed, and resulted in a great waste of money
(see Table 1).
Table 1. The four Italian power reactors
Place Type Power Date start b Date shut down
Latina c Gas-graphite 210 MWe May 1963  November 1986
Garigliano BWR General Electric 150 MWe January 1964 August 1978
Trino Vercellese PWR Westinghouse 260 MWe October 1965 March 1987
Caorso BWR General Electric 860 MWe May 1978 October 1986
a To these, one must add the research reactors Avogadro, Tapiro, Triga, Raptus, Exor (Ispra), the Cirene, the never
finished fast reactor PEC, and the military research reactor at CAMEN near Pisa.
b date of connection to the electric grid.
c At the date of its start it was the most powerful nuclear reactor in Europe.
However, in 1963-64 these developments suffered a drastic standstill, when the General Secretary
of  the  Italian  Commission  for  Nuclear  Energy  (CNEN),  Felice  Ippolito,  was  charged  and
condemned for  administrative irregularities.  Only in  1971 the construction began of the bigger
nuclear plant at Caorso, which however had to wait 1981 to start operating.
During  the  Seventies  and  Eighties  a  sequence  of  more  or  less  pharaonic  National  Energy
Programmes (PEN) was proposed by successive Governments,  but strong popular protests were
growing. Actually, the history  of the Italian nuclear  programmes cannot be considered complete
until a full history of popular movements is reconstructed. And this is a difficult challenge, since
popular movements hardly ever leave documentary traces of their organization and actions, so that
we can only  resort to oral history, or newspaper articles. In fact, while the construction of a fifth
nuclear  plant began, a popular referendum was launched, intended to shut down altogether  the
Italian nuclear  programmes.  The impression of  the  1986 Chernobyl incident  contributed  to  the
result of the referendum in 1987, which put an end to Italian nuclear ambitions (but left behind a
heavy inheritance, a real emergence which is far from being closed after three decades). 
A quarter  of  a  century  later,  the  short-lived  attempt  at  relaunching  nuclear  energy  by  the
Berlusconi  government  in  2008  was  buried  after  the  Fukushima  disaster  by  a  second national
referendum in 2011. In the meantime almost nothing has been done about the inheritance left by the
previous programmes, leaving the problems of the decommissioning of four reactors and of the
disposal of nuclear waste practically unsolved, with heavy economic burdens and environmental
and health hazards.
4. The postwar economic and industrial situation. Big interests and energy choices
Although Italy suffered severe destruction from the war, damages to industrial structures were
relatively limited. Thanks in part to the partisans and workers who occupied the factories, a network
of recently built plants was left standing mainly in the industrialized North, although with a capacity
utilization rate of only around 50%7. The collapse of German competition and cheap labour opened
great prospects for the Italian industry.
The electric  and steel  industries  had acquired  a  strong power under  fascism and in  wartime,
thanks to their  close connections with the regime: after the war they were in the best position to
exploit  the  difficult  situation  of  the  country,  and  strongly  opposed  any  policy  of  economic
planning.8
Reconstruction and industrial restructuring was based essentially on mature technologies, and the
strong economic development of the years 1950-1963 owed much to the low cost of labour and
labour-intensive  production  in  the  car  industry.  Electricity  production  was  almost  entirely  of
hydroelectric  origin,  and completely  in  the  hands of  highly concentrated private  companies:  in
1941, 8 firms out of the existing 320 controlled 77% of the electricity production; in 1960, 5 firms
out of 600 controlled 81% of the production. The left-wing repeatedly proposed since 1946-1947
the nationalization of the electric industry, but this was always rejected by the Christian Democratic
party, under the pressure of the power monopolies.9 When this confrontation came to an end in 1948
with the defeat of the left, the minister of industry, Ivan Matteo Lombardo, authorized the escalation
of electricity rates up to 2,300%, along with a series of other concessions. Lombardo was a member
of the Social Democratic Party and a follower of Saragat, whose crucial role in connection with
American interests we will deal with later on. Thus every initiative in the nuclear field – from the
nuclear law to the study of reactors – was seen with suspicion: even the construction of nuclear
plants was opposed by power monopolies, at least until they realized (around the mid-1950s) that
public companies (CNRN, ENI) would start building them. Then they also rushed in, with the intent
of influencing the by then urgent nuclear law.
There were however in post-war Italy other economic and political forces that supported different
alternatives  for  the  development  of  the  country,  aimed  at  achieving a  more  autonomous  and
prominent role  in  the international  context.  During the 1950s,  Olivetti  reached a  world-leading
position in electronic computers. A very relevant initiative was the foundation in 1953 of a State
owned oil company, ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), having the monopoly for the exploitation of
national resources, thanks to the media campaign financed by Enrico Mattei in order to promote the
discovery of natural gas and oil fields in Italy. Mattei was an innovative and resourceful, though
fairly unscrupulous, Christian Democratic manager,10 who opposed the schemes of private industry.
He also developed a direct, deeply innovative policy towards oil producing countries (the so-called
“fifty-fifty” contracts), opposing the oligopolistic international policy of the “Seven Sisters” which
dominated the world oil market.
One must also recall that Italy – a unique case among capitalistic countries – had inherited from
fascism also an important economic state sector,11 with IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale,
Institute for Industrial  Reconstruction), founded in 1933 in order to sustain industrial firms and
banks facing economic difficulties.
5. Early developments concerning nuclear power in Italy, 1945-1957
5.1. From the early proposals to CISE, 1945-1952
The first ideas about peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy were aired as early as August 1945,
in the aftermath of the news about the atomic bomb, by three young Italian scientists: the physicists
Giorgio Salvini and Carlo Salvetti, of the University of Milan, and the engineer Mario Silvestri,
who had just been hired by the electrical firm Edison and employed in the Technical Department.
The Managing Director, Vittorio De Biasi, asked the Department to immediately collate information
on this new form of energy.
Around the end of the year Amaldi prepared a report entitled La Fisica in Italia (Physics in Italy),
in  which  he  stated  his  opinion  on  what  was  needed  not  only  for  the  future  recovery  and
development of fundamental research in Italy, but also for “the right and proper development of
peaceful applications of nuclear physics”.12
Salvini, Salvetti and Silvestri aroused the interest of professor Giuseppe Bolla, of the University
of Milan, and at the beginning of 1946 they drafted a three-stage plan for assembling a research
group, setting off  a nuclear chain reaction,  and building in perspective an experimental nuclear
reactor.  Bolla visited Amaldi in  Rome, who agreed to collaborate,  with his  colleagues  Gilberto
Bernardini and Bruno Ferretti13. The largest industrial groups in northern Italy were contacted, and
the idea took shape of setting out an ad hoc company.
These initiatives however had to be kept under wraps since Italy had yet to sign the peace treaty,
and was forbidden from embarking in  nuclear  research.  The Italian  politicians  were  absolutely
unaware of this kind of problems. Thus, in September 1946 the promoters went to Paris in order to
contact the Italian delegation to the negotiations for the Peace treaty and warn them of the risk that
the  treaty  could permanently  forbid  Italy  from  working  with  peaceful  applications  of  nuclear
physics.
When it was clear that this danger had been escaped, just before the Peace treaty was signed in
December  1946,  the  limited  liability,  non-profit  company  CISE  (Centro  Informazioni  Studi
Esperienze,  Centre  for  Information,  Studies  and  Experiences)  was  established  in  Milan  on  19
November 1946 in order to build a nuclear reactor for power generation purposes. CISE was housed
in premises of Edison, and the shareholders were some major Italian industrial groups: the electric
companies Edison and SADE, FIAT, Cogne (foundry), Montecatini (not long afterwards), Falck,
Pirelli,  Olivetti (in 1949), Terni (in 1950). The Scientific Committee of CISE, presided over by
Bolla,  was composed by technicians appointed by the shareholders,  and integrated by the three
young promoters, and the physicists Amaldi, Bernardini, Ferretti, and Giovanni Polvani (University
of Milan). Since it was evident to everybody that the birth of a domestic electro-nuclear industry
was too big an endeavour for private companies, and the intervention of government was necessary
(although feared), the president of the National Research Council (CNR), Gustavo Colonnetti, was
included from the outset as an observer.
For  more than five years CISE was the only body in Italy which dealt  with research on the
peaceful applications of nuclear energy. In the early years CISE had to devote itself mainly to the
training of qualified personnel. By the end of 1951 CISE (despite a transitory crisis due to the
hesitations  of  some partners)  had built  a  pilot  plant  to  make heavy water  through electrolysis,
created  an  experimental  uranium  metallurgy  plant,  undertaken  in  its  laboratories  important
measures  on  uranium  fission,  developed  leading-edge  electronic  instruments,  besides  training
specialized personnel.
In the meantime, between 1947 and 1951 the second of Amaldi’s aims was fulfilled, with the
creation of centres of CNR for fundamental nuclear research in the Universities of Rome, Padua,
Turin and Milan, and the final establishment in 1951 of the National Institute of Nuclear Physics
(INFN),  also  pertaining  to  CNR.14 The  presence  of  Amaldi  in  CISE avoided interferences  and
overlapping among programmes of fundamental and applied nuclear research: in fact, a division of
duties was established between fundamental research, centred in Rome, and applied research in the
North.
The access of Italy to NATO in 1949 paved the way to collaboration with the United States in
peaceful nuclear technology: this was made effective in 1955 with a bilateral agreement, and came
into force in July 1956. Previously, the main supply of uranium, around 300 kg, had arrived from
Spain in 1948.
Despite  this,  repeated attempts  at  making aware the Italian government  of  the importance of
peaceful  nuclear  technology  were  unsuccessful.  In  1950  for  first  time  CISE  unsuccessfully
attempted to involve directly the Ministry of Defence and the army, raising the criticism of Amaldi,
who was worried that the initiative could pass into the hands of the military.15 On the other hand, the
Italian  military  showed  their  ridiculous  backwardness  in  nuclear  matters  with  the  alleged
experiment of an “H bomb” carried out in the shooting range of Nettuno, near Rome, in 1952, when
neither the Americans nor the Soviets had yet produced it!16
5.2. The first State initiative, CNRN, 1952-1955
At  last,  a  receptive  political  interlocutor  was  found  in  the  Minister  of  Public  Works,  Pietro
Campilli: in 1952 the critical economic situation of CISE was rebalanced, and on 26 June 1952 a
National Committee for Nuclear Research (CNRN) was established, parallel to similar institutions
in other countries.17 But, in order to bypass thorny discussions in Parliament and opposition inside
CISE against any kind of State initiative CNRN was not established with a law, but by a Prime
Minister’s  Decree.  This  solution deprived the Committee of  legal  status,  an aspect  that  was to
generate several problems in the future. CNRN received state financing from IRI and the Ministry
of Industry through CNR, though it was not an organ of CNR. It financed and coordinated the
activities of both CISE and INFN. It was provided with a budget of one billion Italian Lire, higher
than the whole budget of CNR (while the budgets of the American AEC and the British AEA were
equivalent  to  about  800  and  110  billion  Lire  respectively).  Nevertheless,  the  establishment  of
CNRN was considered a great step forward. It was chaired by Francesco Giordani, a chemist who
had been president of IRI and CNR during the war, with a southern mentality and hostile to the
northern private  industry.  CNRN included,  among others,  Amaldi  (who left  CISE),  Ferretti,  De
Biasi, Arnaldo Angelini, vice president of Finelettrica, and a young geologist, Felice Ippolito, who,
as the youngest, was appointed secretary.
CNRN was since the beginning a place of political confrontation and share-out. Moreover, with
all  its  high  ambitions,  its  legal  indefiniteness  made  it  an  inefficient  administrative  entity:  the
Committee  overcame  these  difficulties  through  expedients  designed  to  circumvent  the  legal
deficiencies, but these were to emerge later on.
CNRN  was  a  committee  with  no  technical  staff,  while  CISE  was  a  research  structure.
Nevertheless,  the  collaboration  of  CNRN  with  CISE  was  marked  since  the  beginning  by
disagreements and suspicions. There was a clash of mentalities between Giordani and De Biasi. The
public companies involved in CISE did not meet Giordani’s expectations. 
In 1952 CISE submitted to CNRN a proposal for the construction of an Italian 1.000 kW natural
uranium, heavy-water reactor,18 but it was not taken into consideration. Only later Giordani made
the request for a higher power reactor, and CISE began the work for the already mentioned project
Cirene (CIse.REattore.aNEbbia, CISE fog reactor). Moreover, Giordani initially opposed CISE’s
request for financing, objecting that it  was a private institution, and when this was resolved the
funds  were  in  any  case  insufficient.  In  the  meantime,  other  private  nuclear  companies  were
established,  backed  by  powerful  industrial  concerns.  FIAT and  Montecatini  jointly  created  the
Società Ricerca Impianti Nucleari (SORIN), and the electric companies the Società Elettronucleare
Italiana (SELNI). On the other hand, the construction of a major public research centre began at
Ispra in 1955.
A major  impulse in nuclear matters was no doubt provided by the launch of the “Atoms for
Peace” campaign in 1953. Even in Italy decisions took shape, despite the unsolved contradictions.
5.3. Missions in the United States and purchase of reactors, 1955
In March 1955, CNRN sent a delegation to the US with the aim of purchasing a supply of heavy
water, of negotiating the purchase of a 1.000 kW, CP-5 research reactor fuelled with 20% enriched
uranium, and of exploring the possibility of the supply of a power nuclear plant.19
This was indeed a radical change of objective compared to the previous  programme of CISE,
which focused on the project of a domestic reactor. This turned instead to a dependence on foreign
technology, and was considered a betrayal by Edison, worried that the public sector could develop
on its own the production of electronuclear energy.
This initiative prompted an immediate reaction by the electrical industry, which in October 1955
sent to the US another mission, composed by Giorgio Valerio, General Manager of Edison, Franco
Castelli and Silvestri. This mission also aimed to discuss the purchase of a nuclear reactor, after
some contacts had already started in 1954: such initiative raised some surprise even inside the AEC,
besides the opposition from CNRN, which urged a legislative initiative from the government.
At the Geneva Conference on nuclear power Italy presented 6 communications (4 from CISE).
In July 1956 CNRN president Giordani resigned, trying to force the Government to overcome the
situation of uncertainty and financial difficulties of the Committee (he was appointed president of
CNR). The Secretary, Felice Ippolito, took the position of General Secretary. Prime Minister Segni
was inclined to dissolve CNRN, but Ippolito succeeded in strengthening it. CNRN was officially
renewed with a Prime Minister’s decree in August 1956. Since the new President, a trustworthy
Christian Democratic senator named Basilio Focaccia, was completely unread in nuclear energy,
Ippolito had more freedom in governing the Committee and pursuing his own views: a new phase
began, fraught with crucial events. With the renewal of CNRN, De Biasi was excluded.
In this period the CP-5 research reactor was finally purchased by CNRN from the US (though
some, like Edoardo Amaldi and Mario Ageno, pushed for a British choice): it was very expensive
($3 million) and became operative in 1959 at the new centre in Ispra, with a power of 5.000 kW and
the name Ispra-1. It showed immediately heavy design shortcomings.20
The construction of the mentioned research centre at Ispra raised immediate problems for CNRN.
Lacking legal status, it had to create an ad hoc joint-stock company in order to acquire the ground.
CISE was involved in the construction, but the tensions with CNRN flared, leading in September
1957 to a break in all  relations between the two organizations.  CNRN decided to  continue the
project alone. But again CNRN had to create a joint-stock company (NUCLIT), which took on a
large  number  of  the  staff  previously  employed by CISE,  which  consequently  had to  recast  its
programmes and activities. CNRN finally took a dominant position in Italy’s civil nuclear industry,
assuming  also  technical  tasks.  The  centre  of  Ispra  was  finished  in  1959,  but  it  was  almost
immediately made over to Euratom, together with the CP-5 reactor, for a Community centre. It was
probably a far-sighted choice on Ippolito's part, judging that the burden was too high for CNRN.
Contradictions  emerged also at  a  European level.  In  1956 a commission composed by Louis
Armand,  Franz  Atzel  and  Giordani,  president  of  CNRN,  proposed  a  gigantic  programme  for
installing by 1967 a total  nuclear power capacity covering ¼ of the electrical  output of the six
States, purchasing reactors from the US. On the contrary, in 1957 CEE established Euratom with the
opposite aim of developing an autonomous and competitive nuclear capacity. The same 1957 was
the  year  of  the  secret  initiative  of  France,  Germany  and  Italy  with  the  ambitious  purpose  of
developing  European  nuclear  armaments,21 which  was  abandoned  when  De  Gaulle  decided  to
develop a French force de frappe.
Also the Italian military tried again to enter the nuclear programmes. An attempt to condition the
national choices and to join CNRN in 1954 was thwarted by Giordani. In 1956 CAMEN (Centre for
Military Applications of Nuclear Energy) was established near Pisa,22 with the mission of training
personnel  and  studying  nuclear  propulsion  and  nuclear  armaments.  The  military  planned  the
purchase  of  a  nuclear  reactor  in  the  US  through  CNRN,  clashing  with  Ippolito.  Through  the
Ministry of Defence and collaboration with the American embassy in Rome, in 1957 they purchased
a pool-type reactor,23 an untenable choice for military applications! The reactor was shut down in
1980,  with  subsequent  controversies  on  the  (classified)  decommissioning  and  delivery  of
radioactive wastes. CAMEN later changed its name into CISAM (Inter-service Centre for Military
Studies  and  Applications): in  1973-1975  classified  tests  were  performed  of  a  nuclear  capable
missile. Italy was to join NPT in 1975.
6. The three nuclear plants, 1957-1964
After  these preliminaries,  among these deep contradictions,  and without  any general  strategy,
between 1956 and 1958 the contracts were signed for the purchase of three nuclear power plants, by
Edison,  CNRN and ENI in  close sequence.  They were in  fact  three uncoordinated,  completely
different,  and competing designs,  but  they  were to  project  Italy in  1964 to  the  third  place for
electro-nuclear production in the world, behind the US and UK: a sudden emergence that was the
contingent, almost paradoxical, result of the deep contradictions, even of the backwardness of the
country. Around 1957 there were barely a few prototypes of power nuclear plants working in the
world.24 The choice  between different  models  was objectively very complex,  and the available
experience very restricted. The choice also had heavy political implications: for instance, the choice
of an enriched uranium reactor would have determined a strict dependence from the US for the fuel,
but  a  different  choice  would  clash  with  American  interests.  The lack  of  a  national  legislation,
hindered  by  private  industries,  created  big  problems  (localization,  licence,  control,  protection,
management of the cue of the nuclear cycle), and even obstacles in the bargaining with the United
States.
What’s  more,  in  all  three  cases  the  Italian  purchasers  ordered  plants  that  were  still  in  an
experimental stage, for which no prototypes were actually up and running, and which were built
concurrently with the first reactors of their type in the US and UK. The technology was immature,
and consequences were to become apparent during plant operation.
We have seen how Edison's visit to the US in 1955 was a reaction to the previous mission from
CNRN. When Edison was the first to order a light-water nuclear power plant from Westinghose,
this was an attempt to prevent the advent of state-controlled nuclear power from paving the way to
nationalization of the electrical industry. Without this fear, private industry would not have invested
any money in nuclear energy. In 1957-58 Edison, through SELNI, applied to the Italian Government
for a guarantee on exchange rates, in order to protect the loan from future rate fluctuations.25 In
winter 1957-58 the loan had been formalized with the Export-Import Bank for $34 million: however
Ippolito pressed the Ministry of Industry against the lending, which in fact was denied. De Biasi
asked in vain to sack Ippolito. The construction of the Edison nuclear plant was delayed, and it was
preceded by those built by the state groups IRI and ENI. The contract was signed only in 1957 with
Westinghouse, for a 242 MW reactor, whose prototype was the Yankee one at Rowe, Massachusetts.
Only in 1957 CNRN approved the project, subject to a safety report by the company, and only in
1960 the location was decided, at Trino Vercellese, near Turin: a previous attempt to locate the plant
at  Moneglia,  near  Genoa,  was  thwarted  by  the  first  instance  of  popular  opposition.  The  plant
reached criticality in June 1965, was first connected to the network in October 1965, and began
commercial generation in December 1965. The final cost of the plant was of $41 million (against
the $34 million loan).
In October 1956 both IRI and ENI expressed the intention of building nuclear plants, in Southern
Italy (as national entities).  In 1957 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD, of the UN), together with the Banca d’Italia, proposed to the Italian government a common
study for a nuclear plant. The agreement was signed in July 1957, and the construction (project by
ENSI, Energia Nucleare Sud Italia) was assigned to Finelettrica (IRI) through the public company
Società ElettroNucleare Nazionale (SENN, drawn out of SELNI). Nine companies participated in
the  international  tender  (four  American,  four  British  and  one  French).  In  September  1958  an
American  reactor  was  finally  purchased,  a  150  MW,  BWR  light  water  reactor  from  General
Electric. It was built at Garigliano, Southern Italy, with funds from the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno
(Fund for Southern Italy) and a financial support of $40 million from the World Bank. 26 The plant
reached criticality in June 1963, was initially connected to the grid in January 1964, and began
commercial generation in May 1964 (Figure 2): it was to be shut down for good in 1978 due to an
accident.
The third project deserves specific attention. It was built by ENI, whose president, Enrico Mattei,
had created in 1956 a specific section, AGIP-Nucleare: for the construction, the SIMEA company
was created (Società Italiana Meridionale per l’Energia Atomica). Mattei’s choice is remarkable
since, in accordance to his strategy of gaining autonomy from the United States, he chose a British
gas-cooled “Magnox” reactor, fuelled with natural uranium. The plant was built in Southern Italy,
near Latina. Its total cost was around $60 million, and in fact it  was the first one to enter into
function: criticality was reached on 27 December 1962, electric generation began in May 1963, and
commercial production in January 1964. At that date it was the most powerful nuclear reactor in
Europe.
      
Figure 2. The Garigliano NPP – and his American twin, Dresden1 – were characterized by a containment sphere to
prevent radioactivity release.  In reality the containment sphere does not ensure a perfect seal, so this solution was
abandoned after these two prototypes, and was replaced by more efficient containment structures.
The profitability of these projects, and the cost of the electric power produced, seem far from
clear,  and caused heated and crucial  debates  (Section  9).  A “partisan”  diagnosis,  from a CISE
representative, maintains that: «According to official estimates the cost of the electric energy Kwh
was Lire 7,80 (Latina), Lire 7,20 (Garigliano), Lire 5,40 (Turin), compared with a cost of traditional
energy lower than 5 Lire. This means that the annual burden for Italy is around 7 - 8 billion Lire».27
7. 1960, the ambiguous transformation of CNRN into CNEN and the proliferation of nuclear
centres and projects
A CNRN  “white  paper”  of  1957  was  practically  a  five-year  plan  for  nuclear  research.  In
subsequent  years CNRN got  to administer  significant amounts of money and employed around
1700 people. Its activities encompassed a wide range of ambitious initiatives and projects, from the
development  of reactors and the fuel  cycle,  to the training of scientific  and technical  staff,  the
diffusion of information and scientific culture, and fundamental physics. The latter field absorbed
around 20%, through the INFN, whose main commitment was the construction of a large electron
synchrotron at Frascati laboratory, near Rome.
The  legal  regulation  of  the  field  at  a  national  level  remained  however  far  from  clear.  The
opposition against an organic nuclear act caused the failure of four bills during the 1950s. The
European (Euratom) and international (IAEA) developments after 1957, as well as the gift of Ispra
to Euratom by Ippolito in 1959, reinforced support for national regulation, in spite of the resistance
from the private electrical industry. Moreover, in 1959 CNRN was under extension and faced again
financial difficulties. The new Ministrer of Industry, Emilio Colombo, submitted another bill, which
met again strong opposition. But further postponement was infeasible, and a transitional law was
approved  in  August  1960,  establishing  the  National  Committee  for  Nuclear  Energy  (CNEN,
Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare).28 It was not a merely new name for CNRN, since
CNEN was assigned new tasks, such as the technical control and testing of all the nuclear plants
under  construction,  and  it  was  granted  a  legal  status,  overcoming  the  anomalies  of  CNRN:
nonetheless,  not  even  CNEN  was  a  public  economic  corporation  enabled  to  carry  out
entrepreneurial initiatives. CNEN was chaired by the Minister of Industry (who however assumed
the double role of inspector and inspected), and was run by an Executive Committee. But the five-
year plan for nuclear research underwent further delays, creating recurring financial problems to
CNEN. Moreover INFN remained in a state of legal uncertainty, and of tension with CNEN.
Obviously CISE expressed a very negative opinion on this act, since CNEN left it no elbow room
whatsoever. The more so, since Ippolito was appointed Secretary General of CNEN. As a matter of
fact, Ippolito was given a free hand in the administration of CNEN. This started a phase of great
impulse  and dynamism in the  management  of  the Committee  and of  the whole  Italian nuclear
programme, a sort of (however brief) “age of Ippolito”. There is no doubt that in the confused
institutional  status  of  CNEN,  and  with  the  chronic  stickiness  of  Italian  bureaucracy  hindering
scientific  research,  Ippolito’s  administration  adopted  unscrupulous  procedures,  at  the  limit  of
legitimacy,  in  order  to  circumvent  bureaucratic  complications  and speed up the  decisions.  But
neither is there any doubt that this style was approved and admired in the milieu of research, and the
“age of Ippolito” was to be recalled as a model of efficiency. It is important to remark that even the
political class in the government was informed, or aware, of possible administrative irregularities in
the  management  of  CNEN,  but  did  not  intervene:  the  storm was  to  explode  in  a  sudden  and
unforeseen way three years later (Section 9).
Actually,  the  new tasks  of  CNEN multiplied  the  ambitious  nuclear  programmes and centres,
which  were  only  in  part  already  provided  by  CNRN:  Italy,  although  still  lacking  an  organic
organization and legislation, apparently acted as one of the most ambitious actors in this field! In
fact, the overall programme aimed at reaching a complete autonomy for the Italian nuclear industry,
from the design and construction of reactors, up to fuel fabrication and reprocessing, i.e. the full
fuel cycle. However, as we have remarked, such an ambitious programme was not an exception, but
fitted into a project pursued by a part of the Italian leading class, which meant to make the country a
leader on the world market, both economically and technologically. In particular, not only the goal
of energetic independence, but also the unscrupulous approach was common to both Ippolito and
Enrico Mattei, although the latter was rather a business leader.
Actually, the first five-year plan (1959-1964) for CNEN, financed with 80 billion Lire for the first
year, planned the design and testing of four types of reactors: boiling water, cooled with organic
substances  (PRO,  Progetto  Reattore  Organico,  with  a  cooling  mixture  of  biphenyles  and
triphenyls), liquid metal, and high temperature gas. The PRO was a joint project between Agip
Nucleare  (ENI  Group),  Fiat  and Montecatini,  through AGIP-Nucleare  and SORIN, including a
partnership  with  American  companies  (Atomic  International,  Martin  Marietta),  coordinated  by
CNEN via research contracts. The project was abandoned during the 1960s (see below). One must
remark  that  some  of  these  projects  are  not  yet  satisfactorily  working  even  today  in  the  most
advanced nuclear countries!
On the side of fuel reprocessing, Italy was already taking part in the Eurochemic experimental
plant near Mol, Belgium (an OECD joint venture), through CNEN and SORIN, while the EUREX
(Enriched  URanium EXtraction)  pilot  plant  was  under  construction  at  the  Research  Centre  of
Saluggia, in northwest Italy:29 in the forthcoming years changes in Eurochemic ended up making the
Eurex plant  obsolete.30 Moreover,  the centre  of  Casaccia  had been established near  Rome,  and
provided with some research reactors. 
A programme was also put in place for the uranium-thorium cycle (PCUT, Progetto Ciclo Uranio
Torio)31, in collaboration with the American AEC, aiming to design, build, and run both a chemical
separation plant and a pilot integral-cycle plant: two centres were built, at Trisaia in the South and,
some years after,  near the Lake Brasimone, on the Tuscan-Emilian Apennines. The Trisaia plant
(ITREC) stood for many years as the only one in the world designed to recuperate U-233 from
Thorium: in those times it was an original design, but like the PRO, the PCUT was to be abandoned
during the 1960s. After the shutdown of the Italian nuclear programmes (Section 9) Trisaia became
a “nuclear rubbish bin”, when 84 fuel elements from the Elk River American nuclear plant were
purchased in 1967, while the U-Th cycle was abandoned worldwide, with the exception of India.
Sixty-four  fuel  elements  remained  in  the  site,  with  no  more  possibility  of  reprocessing,  a
paradoxical inheritance.
However, all these centres and programmes were to leave a heavy inheritance when the whole
Italian nuclear programme came to a stop!
8. 1962, the nationalization of the electric industry (ENEL) and the Nuclear law
One of  the  indisputable  merits  of  CNEN’s  approach  to  the  nuclear  programmes  was  that  it
involved collaborations with several industrial sectors, giving them a stimulus, and contributing to
divide the industrial front opposed to the Nuclear Law. On the other hand, both the development of
the nuclear programme and the developments in Europe posed the increasing need of overcoming
the fragmentation of the Italian electrical system. This concerned both domestic production and the
unification of the national electric grid on the one hand, and, on the other hand its connection to the
European grid. An important step was the unification of electric fares in May 1961, which also
strengthened the need of extending the grid to all users, by building an Apennine ridge power line,
and providing for a national power reserve to meet the peaks in demand. Which private producer
could assume the burden of building plants to be up only in these cases?
The definition of a Nuclear Law became therefore strictly intertwined with the harshly debated
problem of the nationalization of the electric industry.32 This measure was strongly supported by the
Socialist party (PSI), and was finally approved by the first centre-left government in December
1962, with the creation of ENEL (Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica). It was really an epochal
step in Italian history. The Christian Democratic Party, inside which fierce power struggles were
underway, accepted nationalization out of calculation, or at a Hobson’s choice. On the other hand,
the electric utilities were indemnified with pharaonic amounts of money. The underlying idea was
that  the  firms  would  use  such huge  amounts  to  develop other  sectors,  and give  a  tremendous
impulse  to  the  Italian  economic  system:  unfortunately,  the  Italian  managers  proved  frightfully
incapable,  and  squandered  such  a  richness  in  the  following  years.33 Ippolito  himself  correctly
remarked that the state could have bought the electrical utilities at a very low cost after the war,
whereas it supported their recuperation: in that case Italian history could have taken a completely
different turn.34 In 1962, moreover, the electrical industry had already exploited the main benefits
from the existing resources, so that nationalization resulted in a big business.
The  first  centre-left  majority  finally  approved  in  December  1962  the  nuclear  bill,  already
submitted  since  January  1961,  which  established  that  the  production  of  nuclear  energy  was  a
prerogative of the state, or of state-controlled stock companies. The second five-year plan (1965-
1970)  for  CNEN had  already  been  approved   in  October  1962.  It  confirmed  all  the  previous
programmes, and provided for the installation by 1970 of 1.000-1.500 MW with the design and
construction  of  2-4  nuclear  plants.  The  division  of  duties  between  the  nuclear  body  and  the
electricity organization was established. CNEN was assigned – alongside its  duties of research,
design and development of reactors – the responsibility for monitoring plant  safety through its
Safety and Protection Management Office (DISP,  Direzione Sicurezza e Protezione), which, as a
matter of fact, has made up for the absence in Italy of a Nuclear Safety Agency. ENEL was put in
charge of developing nuclear power within the framework of the national electricity system, with
decision-making capacity on all aspects of power stations construction. The three nuclear power
stations were handed over to ENEL.
At the beginnings of 1963 Ippolito was appointed to the board of directors of ENEL, though the
law which had established CNEN did not allow this. This fact was to have important implications in
the forthcoming events.
9. The “Ippolito trial” (and other disquieting events), 1962-64, and the halt to the Italian
ambitions of autonomous development
Behind  these  apparently  successful  events,  however,  the  political  and  economic  circles,  both
national and international, were very concerned about Italian  development policies, and perceived a
great  danger  for  their  privileges  and  business.  Starting  exactly  from  1962  a  succession  of
disquieting events, which could hardly be considered accidental, systematically eliminated all the
most resourceful leading players on the Italian scene and stopped the most advanced experiences,
not only the ambitious nuclear programmes. One can hardly avoid the impression that the history of
Italy came to a crossroads, and that the most conservative forces (among which mafia) and the
most  powerful  international  interests  succeeded  in  eliminating  every  chance  of  progressive
development, growth and competitiveness in Italy: in the subsequent decades a lot of “mysteries”
and unsolved assassinations,  massacres and  attempted coups d'état have stained with blood the
history  of  the  country.  In  1974  Pier  Paolo  Pasolini  warned:  “I  know  …  but  I  have  not  the
evidence”.35 Since the spring of 1972 Pasolini was working on a novel, Petrolio (Oil), which was to
be  a  pitiless  and  substantiated  accusation  about  «the  crisis  of  our  republic,  with  oil  in  the
background as the big protagonist … our sufferings, our immaturities, our weaknesses, and the state
of subjection of our bourgeoisie,  of our presumptuous neocapitalism» (from a statement  of the
writer Paolo Volponi)36.  When Pasolini was murdered, in 1975, the novel was still only a draft,
which was published in 1992 with a white cover:37 there was moreover the unsolved mystery of the
manuscript of one chapter, which disappeared!
Already in 1960 there had been an attempt at a fascist revival with the Tambroni cabinet and
subsequent  bloody  street  reactions.  It  has  been  proved  that  among  the  political  and  financial
supporters of the Tambroni cabinet there was a part of the private electrical industry, determined to
stop at any cost the discussion that had started in Parliament on the nationalization of the electric
industry: there was talk of slush fund, and Giorgio Valerio’s involvement.
On October 27, 1962, Enrico Mattei – the unscrupulous and controversial oil bargainer with the
Arab  countries,  who was  circumventing  the  “Seven  Sisters”  –  died  in  a  crash  of  his  personal
aircraft. The cause has never been clarified, but was almost certainly an attempt on his life.38
Just a couple of months before, on August 11, in the midst of vacations, the influential Italian
newspaper  Corriere della Sera had published a note by the already mentioned President of the
Socialist Democratic Party (PSDI), Giuseppe Saragat, with the title: “Electricity and nuclear energy:
squanderings denounced by Saragat”: this ambiguous individual, strongly linked with the American
circles,  affirmed  that  ENEL was  a  good  company,  while  CNEN’s  General  Secretary,  Ippolito,
administered in a quite questionable way the funds from the State; and running the nuclear plants
was  absolutely  uneconomic  in  comparison  with  traditional  plants.  This  preliminary  attack  was
therefore against nuclear energy, and Ippolito, who was its most combative supporter. 
It is impossible, and out of place here, to enter into the details of this affair, which has still many
obscure  aspects,  basically  related  to  power  struggles,  mainly  inside  the  majority  Christian
Democratic party.39 Its substance however is  very clear:  the final aim was to stop, through the
person of Ippolito, the Italian nuclear programmes and projects! In Italy bureaucracy has always
been extremely complicated, and difficult to respect in any detail: in any case, no matter how illicit
Ippolito’s  administration  may  have  been,  this  could  not  have  justified  the  stop  to  the  nuclear
programs. For such irregularities, the majority of the Italian ruling class should be in jail. However,
this is precisely what happened!
There was a committee of inquiry, and a shadowy penal case against Ippolito, who was sentenced
to 11 years' custody (unanimously deemed an exaggeration). He was the sacrificial lamb, while the
politicians who formally had to direct CNEN and authorize Ippolito’s expenditures were not even
mentioned. The Italian scientific community was in its majority sympathetic with Ippolito: Edoardo
Amaldi,  the most influential  scientist,  publicly attacked Saragat;  a distinguished scientist  as the
geneticist Adriano Buzzati-Traverso, on the weekly magazine L’Espresso, spoke of “a new witch-
hunt ongoing in Italy”. But all that was irrelevant: the problem was a political one. 
Subsequently  Saragat  was  elected  President  of  the  Republic.  In  later  years  Ippolito  was
rehabilitated, was granted pardon by Saragat, and even bestowed “for his scientific merits” with the
Cross “for merits” of the Republic. But in the meantime the Italian nuclear projects had undergone a
sudden stop.
Actually, the Ippolito and Mattei cases were not isolated. In 1962 Domenico Marotta, although
already retired, was indicted for administrative irregularities:40 he had been an eminent chemist and
manager, and as Director of the Istituto Superiore di Sanità had brought the Institute to reach a high
international  standing,  with two Nobel  Laureates working for it,  Ernst  Boris  Chain and Daniel
Bovet.
One more very meaningful case was that of the Olivetti company, which had reached a world
leading  position  in  electronic  computers,  pioneering  the  personal  computer  with  the  model
“Olivetti-101”: in fact, in 1964 the control group of the firm – composed by Fiat, Pirelli and two
public banks – decided to transfer, in the total indifference of Government, the Electronic Division
to General Electric! Even here there had been in 1961 a “death” in a car “accident”, that of the
outstanding engineer Mario Tchou, director of the Olivetti laboratory.
As a matter of fact, these events marked the beginning of a sharp decline in the Italian post-
war aspirations to an advanced scientific and technical development, which was barely taking
shape among deep contradictions. Throughout the 1960s Italy got the green light to advanced
research in the field of high-energy physics and accelerators, but was long cut off from more
applied fields, such as solid-state physics and nuclear reactors.41
10. The fourth nuclear plant
The developments of the inquiry on Ippolito and his trial produced a deep bewilderment in the
world of Italian scientific research, and  a strong dejection among CNEN's staff, who felt under
indictment.  Ippolito  represented  efficiency,  struggle  against  bureaucracy,  and  had  become  a
centrepiece  of  the  whole  system of  Italian  research,  which  unanimously  sided  with  him.  The
October 1963 report of the inquiry committee of the Ministry was perceived as an attack against
Italian technical-scientific culture. Anyway it marked the final end of Italian nuclear ambitions.42
An immediate consequence was a stiffening of the administrative procedures, and a slowdown of
CNEN's activities. The new Moro government (December 1963) speeded up the funding to CNEN.
But a report issued by Minister of Industry Giuseppe Medici on the nuclear issues (June 1964:
Medici  1964) concluded that  the two “pilot  experiences” (PRO and PCUT) had not  kept  their
promises (but, as we have remarked, all five failed). A technical committee led by Mario Silvestri
(from  CISE)  curtailed  CNEN’s  activities,  closing  a  number  of  programmes  that  Silvestri  had
opposed in previous years. In the new CNEN steering committee, appointed in 1965, Carlo Salvetti
was  designated  as  Deputy  Chairman,  and  Angelini  was  the  sole  member  confirmed  from the
previous committee. Nevertheless electrical consumption in the country was growing, and in 1966
both Salvetti and Angelini advocated a renewed nuclear power station building programme. 
At any rate, ENEL acquired the property of the nuclear plants, absorbing a large part of their
technical staff. The banner of nuclear energy was taken up by the Italian Communist Party (PCI)
and the unions: the PCI engaged Ippolito, but it had not clear ideas on nuclear matters, like the
majority of the political class.
In any case the second five-year plan had become outdated, since nuclear technology had deeply
evolved since the prototype reactors.
In 1967 ENEL decided to build a fourth Italian nuclear plant, defined the technical specifications,
and  called  for  tenders,  receiving  several  bids  (PWR,  BWR,  Gas,  and  Candu  reactors),  from
American, British, and other European utilities. There were political pressures and compromises.
The “American party” prevailed against a European choice. Finally in 1969 an 840 MW, BWR
reactor was chosen, from General Electric and  Ansaldo Meccanico Nucleare: the reactor actually
was a somewhat hybrid, transition model between nuclear power plant generation I and II. The PCI
was left with the “swindle” of Cirene as a sop.
Meanwhile,  ENEL began  to  plan  a  fifth  power  plant,  setting  in  1968 the  procedures  for  its
construction.  However,  on  the  one  hand  in  1969  safety  regulations  for  new  nuclear  plant
construction and operation were tightened in the US, with substantial growth of costs. On the other
hand, ENEL had to cope with growing financial difficulties, since it had inherited the burden of
paying compensation to the private electric companies, without receiving adequate financing: the
Public Accounting Office expressed the opinion that its debt should not be allowed to grow any
further. Funds were insufficient to order nuclear power plants.
The construction of the fourth plant began at Caorso (Northern Italy) in 1970, by a consortium
formed  by  ENEL-Ansaldo  Nucleare-GETSCO (General  Electric  Technical  Services  Company).
Works were to be completed by 1975, but they suffered delays and cost increase: Caorso's first
connection to the grid took place in 1978 and commercial operation began in 1981.
In 1971 a rearrangement of CNEN was approved by law, but its implementation was delayed. In
December 1971 procedures began for ordering a fifth power plant with a power capacity between
800 and 1.000 MW, and a call for tenders started in December 1972.
11. The 1973 oil crisis and the “oil scandal”. The troubled path of the Italian nuclear
projects, the  National Energy programmes (PEN), and the growth of popular and
environmentalist opposition, until the Three Mile Island accident
The  1973  oil  crisis  subverted  all  the  concepts  and  world  forecasts  on  energy  resources,
production, and consumption.
In Italy, at the beginning of 1974 some magistrates investigating the hoarding of oil during the
Kippur  war,  found eloquent  oil  industry  documents,  implicating  all  the  Italian  political  parties
(except PCI), ENEL’s managers, ministers, in illegal procedures and subsidies in favour of the oil
industry.43 As it often happens in Italy, in spite of corruption for billions of Italian Lire (millions US
$), in the end there was no legal consequence for politicians and managers. The contrast with the
sternness in the Ippolito affair could hardly be more striking! 
The  scandal  moved those  who had stopped  nuclear  energy  to  re-emerge.  In  December  1973
ENEL, upon assurances from the government on the adoption of a new legislation, decided to buy
not one but two power plants, and in summer 1974 orders were placed for four. In August 1975 the
government passed a law that regulated localization procedures, in relation to the recently published
American “Reactor Safety Study” (known as “Rasmussen Report”), which set a safety zone of 16
km radius around nuclear plants. On the basis of this law, ENEL proposed to place the four plants in
Central Italy, two in Lazio (localized later at Montalto di Castro, see below) and two in Molise.44
After oil prices suffered a further hike, CNEN submitted a National Energy Plan (PEN) that was
approved by CIPE (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica) in December
1975. The Plan foresaw different future scenarios for energy demand in Italy for electric energy, it
envisaged the installation in the period 1983-85 of a nuclear power capacity of 13.000-19.000 MW
(up to 20 power stations), and further plants for a total capacity between 46.100 and 62.100 MW by
1990.
In  1976 the  study of  environmental  impact  was presented  for  the  localization  of  2.000 MW
nuclear power plant (BWR type) at Montalto di Castro (Maremma).
In the meantime, a new factor was radically changing the situation with respect to the previous
decade,  since  the  Italian  population  became  increasingly  conscious  and  sensitive  towards  the
problems of health  and the environment,  as well  as  the dangers  of nuclear  energy.  In the first
respect, the worker's struggles in defence of health in the factories, which started during the “Hot
Autumn” of 1969, extended to the population, anticipating the environmentalist movement. In the
second respect, in the late 1970s the first big nuclear accidents began to shake the previous absolute
(and largely uncritical) confidence in the safety of this technology, and to increase the awareness of
the extreme seriousness of its potential consequences. As a matter of fact, strong opposition towards
nuclear  energy began  to  grow among the  populations  concerned  with  possible  localizations  of
nuclear sites,  feeding the birth of popular committees,  environmentalist  associations,  as well  as
opposition from some minority political forces, and even local administrations. The role of “popular
experts” began to emerge, and they were involved in animated public debates with technicians of
the electric industry or nuclear experts.45
Big demonstrations took place at Montalto di Castro, Viadana, Suzzara, San Benedetto Po (in
Lombardy, when the localization of nuclear plants was proposed there). The associations WWF and
“Italia  Nostra”  collaborated,  produced  documents,  and  summoned  meetings  and  debates;46 the
Lombardy  Region  appointed  a  study commission  on nuclear  plants,  and  turned  to  the  Istituto
Superiore  di  Sanità for  advice.  In  these  harsh  debates,  one  should  take  into  account  the  very
peculiar structure of the Italian territory, with many mountains and few flat lands, and a high density
of population and of towns.
However, the majority of the political forces and the unions were strongly in favour of nuclear
energy, including the majority of the Communist Party and the left-wing Union CGIL. Anyway, in
response to these movements the political debate grew: the Industry Committee of the Parliament
held a fact-finding inquiry, which confirmed the government’s focus on nuclear power (April 1977),
and a Parliamentary debate took place.
 The third Andreotti cabinet (which included the PCI) called for an immediate start on power
stations, and the Ministrer of Industry, Donat-Cattin, issued an ultimatum to the Regions asking
them  to  indicate  the  sites  for  the  construction  of  20  nuclear  plants.  ENEL sent  out  calls  for
submission of technical bids for a further eight 1.000 MW units.
In December 1977 CIPE adopted a revised PEN, providing for the immediate construction of
“only” 12-13 nuclear plants, and postponing the remaining 8 until after 1985. The estimates of this
plan  on  future  electric  energy requirements  would  later  turn  out  to  be  exaggerated.  It  was  an
“electric” rather than an “energy” plan,  and several reported data were wrong, or inconsistent. In
response to this, popular protests and marches grew even more. The more so when Prodi, Minister
of Industry in the 4th Andreotti cabinet, on 19 February 1979 authorized the construction of the
nuclear plant in Montalto di Castro: just before the Three Mile Island accident, on 28 March 1979!
In the same days the film “Chinese Syndrome”, with Jane Fonda, came out. In the meanwhile, in
August 1978 the Garigliano nuclear plant had been  shut down for good after several accidents. One
must remark that by the late 1970s the construction time of a power plant was increasing,  and
nuclear industry development was experiencing a general slowdown.
When the subsequent 5th Andreotti cabinet fell, the political elections were preceded by a huge
national protest in Rome on 19 May 1979.
One might ask who should have paid for these gigantic projects. The funds were to be anticipated,
at a high rate, by the American Export Import Bank, and in his 1977 visit to the US Andreotti got
the support of the Monetary Fund, offering both political (no access of PCI to government) and
economic (unpopular measures) guarantees. The Italian industrial groups, both private and public,
were competing for the different patents (Westinghouse’s PWR, General Electric’s BWR, Babcock
and Wilson’s  PWR, and Canadian Candu).  However,  the Italian industry had reached a  certain
development:  a  1978  Confindustria (Italian  Industrial  Federation)  document  ascertained that  in
1977  and  early  1978,  Italian  electromechanics  companies  had  won  more  than  40%  of  all
international electric power station calls for tenders. By the end of the 1970s Italy’s nuclear industry
had acquired a lasting configuration, in which ENI (Fabbricazioni Nucleari) focused on fuel-related
provisioning, and IRI-Finmeccanica (AMN) was responsible for building plants under license from
General Electric.
Moreover, since 1973 a challenging and expensive international collaboration began, when ENEL
entered with a 30% participation in a joint venture with French EDF and German RWE to build
“fast”  breeder  reactors47 (NERSA,  Nucléaire  Européenne  à  Neutron  Rapid  S.A.).  An  Italian
contribution  to  this  programme was to  be  the  construction,  at  the  Centre  of  Brasimone,  of  an
experimental reactor for carrying out tests on fuel elements for fast reactors (PEC, Prova Elementi
Combustibile).48 In  addition,  Italy  acquired  a  25%  participation  in  the  French  gas-diffusion
enrichment plant Eurodif. Moreover in 1976 the silly project was elaborated of a second enrichment
plant to be built in Italy, Coredif, fuelled by four nuclear plants of 1.000 MW each! That was four
times the total Italian nuclear power capacity, including the not-yet-operating Caorso plant. Fond
ambitions were back, in the typical Italian style of improvisations and contradictions. Consider that
France  was  developing  its  Force  de  Frappe,  and  had  a  strong  need  of  plutonium and  highly
enriched uranium: nothing similar was happening, thankfully, in Italy!
As for the big oil industries, their role was by no means weakened after the 1973 oil crisis: in fact
the “Seven Sister”  were  increasingly investing  in  the  nuclear  sector.  The crisis  itself  had  been
piloted from New York, in order to make nuclear energy and American oil competitive.
12. The Eighties: feverish sequence of committees, inquiries, governmental decisions,
movements and protests, until the show down.
The sequence of events became increasingly feverish and excited, and the nuclear problem blew
up as one of the hottest in the Italian context.
The main  bottleneck in  the  implementation  of  the  Italian  nuclear  programmes concerned the
localization of the power plants, which was not ENEL’s responsibility. The choice was complicated
by strong local opposition.49 While the nuclear  programme had broad cross-party support, even
many local party exponents opposed the localization of a plant in their area.
The situation grew worse after the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. In the US it was proposed to
authorize the localization of nuclear plants farther from residential  areas,  to provide emergency
plans and an evacuation radius in case of accidents of 30-40 km. In almost all the Italian territory
tens of thousands would have to be evacuated!
In Italy,  on the institutional side,  in June 1979 the results  of a fact-finding special  ecological
commission from the Senate got a majority of favourable opinions, with the relevant exceptions of
WWF, “Italia Nostra”, and Prof. Mario Pavan of the University of Pavia. In December the new
Ministrer of Industry, Antonio Bisaglia, appointed a Commission on nuclear safety, which approved
a document denouncing the deficiency of the Italian safety rules: but the evaluation was considered
weak by the three environmentalist representatives, who presented a minority report.
PEN was successively revised in 1980 and 1981, providing for the construction of nuclear plants
for at least 6.000 MW (indicating the Regions of Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Campania,
Puglia, and Sicily).  The plan introduced the “standard plant” concept, dubbed “Unified Nuclear
Project”  (PUN),  based  on the  Westinghouse  pressurized  water  technology,  conflicting  with  the
previous choice of General Electric boiling water technology for the Caorso and Montalto plants.
The allocation of responsibilities was to ENEL for commissioning and systems architecture, CNEN
(ENEA, see below) as the monitoring authority, AGIP Nucleare for fuel supply, and Italy’s private
nuclear companies (through a consortium led by AMN as the “main contractor”) for the supply of
plant systems and components.
This  was  to  be  Italy’s  last  serious  attempt  at  nuclear  planning.  During  the  years  1981-1983
popular  opposition  against  nuclear  power  grew further,  supported  also  by  decisions  of  several
municipalities. In order to circumvent this opposition, the way out of economic incentives was tried,
with  a  law  of  1983,  providing  financial  support  to  municipalities  that  accepted  nuclear  and
thermoelectric plants in their territory (besides nuclear, also coal was pushed by the various PENs).
It became clear that out of the four power stations ordered under ENEL’s nuclear programme, only
the Montalto site had a realistic chance of being completed: construction work continued at  an
exceedingly slow pace. In these same years Italy had to reduce from 25 to 16,5% its participation in
the  Eurodif  enrichment  plant,  and  to  undersell  a  part  of  the  enriched  uranium it  had  already
acquired, following the downsizing of its nuclear ambitions.
In the meantime, in 1982 CNEN acquired the new name ENEA, National Authority for nuclear
and Alternative Energies (Ente Nazionale per l’Energia nucleare e le Energie Alternative), with a
few real changes, but a new research section on renewable energies-- although the new 1985 PEN
confirmed 12.000 MW of nuclear power.
ENEA expressed  its  favourable  opinion  for  the  suitability  of  the  sites  of  Viadana  and  San
Benedetto Po, and ENEL begun the geological tests. Anti-nuclear demonstrations, clashes with the
police, and arrests followed. Two municipal referendums were held, at Viadana (1984, 91 % votes
against) and San Benedetto Po (1985, 89 % against). In 1985 there was a big march in Rome.
It must be remarked that the anti-nuclear movement was reinforced by the “Euromissiles” crisis.
The “Doomsday  Clock” of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists was put at barely 3 minutes from
Midnight! The debate on “nuclear winter” grew, the film “The Day After” further impressed the
public, and there was strong opposition to the deployment of Cruise nuclear missiles in Comiso,
Sicily, to balance the planned deployment of SS-20 missiles in the East European States.
13. The last acts of the “drama”
We come to the penultimate act, ironically only 36 days before the Chernobyl accident! On 20
March 1986 CIPE approved the 4th PEN (if the progressive number makes sense), providing only
for the construction of the 2.000 MW plant at Montalto di Castro, plus 2.000 MW more at Trino
Vercellese, in Piedmont (never begun), and the localization by 1986 of two more plants of 2.000
MW each, respectively in Lombardy and Puglia; in addition it provided for the acquisition of 400
MW from the 1.200 MW fast reactor Superphénix under construction in France, a very unfortunate
project, for which Italian taxpayers have paid out 30 % for two decades (to the French government
and  military  the  project  provided  the  management  of  the  plutonium cycle,  and  the  supply  of
plutonium during the construction of the Force de Frappe).
On April  9-13,  1986 the  PCI  held  its  XVIIth congress,  in  which  an  anti-nuclear  motion  was
presented and got almost 50 % of votes.
Barely two weeks later,  on 26 April  1986 the Chernobyl accident  happened.  It  raised a  deep
impression and a huge concern for the behaviour of the “Chernobyl cloud”, and the public debate
and polemic revived. Local and national demonstrations (Rome, 10 May) proliferated. In July the
gathering of signatures for a national referendum began. In October, after a huge demonstration at
Montalto di Castro, the Craxi cabinet decided the stop to the building site, and called for a big
Conference on Energy, which was held in February 1987, without any important result.
The referendum took place on 8-9 November 1987, and was the prologue to the last act of the
Italian nuclear “comedy”. The campaign was harshly fought by the movements and their exponents
against the large majority of the scientific and technical milieus, which kept up their firm faith in
science and technology. Since the Italian law formally allows only for questions concerning the
abolition of specific laws or regulations, the referendum formally could not decide the shut-down of
the  Italian  nuclear  programmes.  The  questions  in  fact  concerned  the  abrogation  of:  (1)  the
prerogative of CIPE to decide the localization of nuclear plants, when the municipalities concerned
did not decide; (2) the economic compensation to the municipalities which hosted nuclear or coal
plants;  and  (3)  the  possibility  for  ENEL to  participate  in  international  nuclear  programmes.
Nevertheless, almost 80% of the votes in favour of the abrogation evidenced a clear popular will
(though the Chernobyl accident undoubtedly played a role). The collaboration to Superphénix was
immediately suspended, and the project of the PEC abandoned.
Here the last act occured. In the aftermath of the referendum, the Government (the first Goria
cabinet)  suspended  the  project  of  the  Trino  plant,  shut  down  the  Latina  plant,  and  started
verifications on the safety of the Caorso plant, and the feasibility of the Montalto di Castro plant
under construction (for the non-nuclear parts).
In any case, the final decisions were “Solomonic”, as it happens in Italy (one can even suspect
that the leading political class seized the moment, being conscious of the insurmountable obstacles
met by the nuclear programmes). In fact, in the subsequent years all the Italian nuclear plants were
closed,  almost  every  activity  in  the  field  of  nuclear  energy  was  dismantled,  reconverting
competencies and agencies to other fields, but leaving a heavy and expensive (although relatively
limited) inheritance: four nuclear plants to be decommissioned, an unsafe system of “temporary”
radioactive waste storages, the majority of the fuel rods still stored in the deactivation pools, often
in precarious conditions (slowly transferred to France for reprocessing).50
In 2003, a  bungled attempt by one of the Silvio Berlusconi  governments to  place a national
storage site for radioactive wastes at Scanzano Ionico (Basilicata, South Italy), imposing it without
any public consultation or information, and declaring a national radioactive emergency, was stopped
by a strong uprising of local populations: the national storage site is still waiting, while the nuclear
emergency was never called off, and quickly forgotten.
14. “Sometimes they come back”: the short-lived attempt at a nuclear revival, 25 years later
One would hardly have expected a revival of nuclear ambitions more than 20 years later, “sprung
from the hat”  after  the general  election of  April  2008, won by Silvio Berlusconi.  In brief,  the
purchase of  four  not  yet  tested  EPR reactors  from French EDF was programmed,  negotiations
began, a (decidedly nuclear-oriented) National Safety Authority was offhandedly established. In
2010  the  IDV party  (Italia  dei  Valori)  proposed  a  national  referendum in  order  to  stop  these
programmes. The interest of the Italian population towards the nuclear issue was very dubious, but
the vote was called for 11-12 June 2011, together with two more referendums for the nationalization
of water services, which were much more felt by the population. Once more, in the community of
physicists and technicians the faith in nuclear technology prevailed, although it was weaker than 24
years earlier (and even more sceptical in other scientific milieus). The Democratic Party this time
pronounced in favour of the stop to the nuclear programmes, however “tepidly” and inconsistently,
since it was against the nationalization of water services. In the meanwhile, on 13 March 2011, the
Fukushima earthquake and nuclear  disaster  happened.  This  made it  easier  to  form the  quorum
required in the Italian national referendums, and around 95% of the voters approved the referendum
questions,  calling  for  the  halt  of  the  nuclear  revival.  Once  more  the  political  decisions  were
opportunistic:  the Safety Agency, which should have been radically transformed, was dissolved
instead (while the popular will against privatization of water services was disregarded).
Italy is  still  left  with almost  all  the problems inherited by its  nuclear  programmes unsolved.
Although modest altogether, these problems are deteriorating and are quite concerning. They have
been entrusted to a State joint-stock company, SOGIN (Società Gestione Impianti Nucleari), which
has been involved in several scandals and they still weigh for around 300-400 million Euros yearly
on the bills of Italian consumers. Only now, the  programme for a national storage of radioactive
wastes is underway, although while we are writing the uncertainties about the acceptance by local
populations of the localization that will be proposed lie heavy on it.
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